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There  are  many  pathways  explaining  the  relationship  between 
socioeconomic  status  and  health;  one  possibility  is  that  some 
normally unobservable characteristic causes people to invest both 
in their financial well-being and their health.  Here we consider the 
possibility that the decision making processes are similar across 
domains and that the steps individuals take to make decisions can 
help to explain the correlation in outcomes across domains.  We 
focus particularly on retirement savings decisions and decisions in 
the  health  domain.    Choices  in  both  domains  have  long-term 
consequences  and  therefore  require  foresight  and  the  ability  to 
process complex information.  Our results suggest that up to 44% 
of the correlation between wealth and health is due to the processes 
that people use to make these choices.   
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I.  Introduction 
  The correlation between socioeconomic status (SES) and health has been documented in 
many papers and many different arenas.
1  Individuals of higher SES can be expected to live 
longer, have fewer chronic conditions, and report better self-reported health.  We investigate 
whether  the  steps  individuals  take  to  make  decisions  in  the  domains  of  health  and  wealth 
contribute  to  the  long-observed  positive  gradient  characterizing  the  relationship:  higher  SES 
tends  to be  correlated  with  better  health.    These  steps  may  include research of alternatives, 
calculations of costs and benefits, or seeking advice.  We find that decision making can explain 
up to 44% of the correlation between health and wealth.   
While the gradient between SES and health has been documented in many papers, there 
has  been  much  debate  over  the  causal  nature  of  this  relationship.    While  many  possible 
explanations have been considered, they can be summarized in three main categories: better 
health is caused by higher SES; higher SES causes better health; or a third factor causes both 
variables to be correlated.   
First, the causal relationship may run from SES to health.  This relationship has been 
shown to be particularly important during childhood.  Education (Lleras-Muney 2005), higher 
parental income (Case et al. 2002 and Condliffe and Link 2008), and even better economic 
indicators during childhood (van den Berg et al. 2006) can have long lasting effects on health.  
There is less evidence to suggest that shocks to income or wealth later in life improve health 
(Carman 2010, Meer et al. 2003 and Snyder and Evans 2006) or that SES after retirement causes 
health  (Adams  et  al.  2003),  although  income  volatility  may  play  a  role  (Sullivan  and  von 
Wachter 2009).  One possible explanation is that education improves knowledge and cognition 
and thus improves health behaviors (Avitabile et al. 2008, Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2010, and 
Cutler et al. 2006) or use of medical services (Goldman and Smith 2002 and 2005).   
Second, worse health may lower socioeconomic status in adulthood.  In particular, those 
who are sick as children may accumulate less human capital and thus have lower socioeconomic 
status throughout the life course (Currie and Stabile 2006 and Currie 2009).  An alternative 
pathway is that poor health may force households to spend down their wealth and reduce their 
labor supply (Smith 1999).   
                                                 
1 Smith (1999) and Smith (2004) provide reviews of the literature; other examples include Currie (2009) and 
Marmot et al. (1991).   3
Third, Fuchs (1982) posited that some third characteristic, such as discount rates, might 
improve both health and SES, leading to the positive correlation.  Those who take an interest in 
their future are more likely to invest in both their health and wealth.  Cutler and Lleras-Muney 
(2010) find no evidence that discounting, risk aversion or the value of the future contribute to the 
correlation between socio-economic status and health, but that social networks may play a role.  
However there is some evidence that discount rates may affect some health behaviors and health 
outcomes, in particular smoking (Khwaja et al. 2007a and 2007b), cancer screening (Picone et al. 
2004) and obesity (Borghans and Golsteyn 2006 and Smith et al. 2005).
2   
We  consider  another  possible  third  factor:  how  people  approach  complex  decisions.  
Preferences over decision making and the steps one takes to make decisions may contribute to 
the correlation observed across domains.  Individuals who prefer to spend more time and effort 
on decision making may do so in multiple domains.  If these efforts are effective and lead to 
better outcomes regardless of the domain, then we would expect to see similar outcomes in 
different domains.   
Individuals face complicated decisions about their future in both the health and wealth 
domains.    These  decisions  are  likely  to  rely  on  many  things,  such  as  utility  maximization, 
discount  rates,  risk  aversion,  information,  and,  in  this  case,  the  processing  of  complex 
information.  In particular, the complexity of the choices and the costs of making choices may 
influence the choices that people make (Ford et al. 1989Payne et al. 1993 and Ford et al. 1989).  
If it is costly to make a decision, some individuals will find it to be worthwhile to invest in a 
careful approach, while others may take shortcuts, choose randomly, or choose the path of least 
resistance.    The  costs  of  decision  making  could  arise,  for  example,  from  the  costs  of 
accumulating  information, the  availability of  experts in your social network, or patience  for 
reading complex materials.  Individuals with lower cognitive abilities, less patience, or less time 
may use simplified processes for making choices.  Importantly for this paper, the way a person 
approaches  complex  decisions  may  cause  that  person  to  make  similar  choices  in  different 
domains.   
In this paper, we investigate how the sophistication of decision making can lead to a 
correlation in outcomes across the domains of health and wealth accumulation.  In particular we 
                                                 
2 Barsky et al. (1997) also consider the effect of time and risk preferences on behavior.  They find that risk 
preferences play a role, but due to data problems are unable to find conclusive evidence about time preferences.   4
quantify the share of the correlation between health and wealth that can be explained by decision 
making processes.  We also consider the possibility that individuals may rely on friends, family 
members, or experts to make these complex decisions.   
We use a survey, fielded in the American Life Panel, specifically designed to measure 
outcomes and decision processes in the domains of retirement savings and health.  We focus on 
wealth accumulation for retirement purposes because this is a measure of SES where current 
decisions are likely to play a role.  The survey measures outcomes such as the amount saved for 
retirement,  having  a  tax  deferred  account,  purchasing  long-term  care  insurance  or  health 
insurance,  and  use  of  health  care.    In  addition,  we  ask  people  about  how  they  have  made 
decisions in these domains in the past.  We assign sophistication scores for each of 6 choices: 
retirement planning, long-term care insurance, health insurance, health choices, dietary choices, 
and frequency of doctor visits.  Sophistication scores are highest for individuals who engage in 
careful calculations and research about various alternatives.   
We  find  evidence  that  individuals  do  indeed  use  similar  processes  across  the  two 
domains.  In addition, we observe pronounced effects of the sophistication of decision making on 
accumulated  retirement  savings  and  health.    Finally,  our  results,  using  a  Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition, indicate that decision processes explain up to 44% of the relationship between 
wealth and health.  Taken together, these results point to the importance of decision making 
processes in explaining the relationship between socioeconomic status and health.   
As an alternative explanation, we consider the possibility that individuals may rely on 
friends, family or experts in making a decision.  We do not find evidence that reliance on these 
groups contributes significantly to the health-wealth gradient.   
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides more information about 
decision processes and a discussion of additional relevant literature.  Section 3 presents our data 
and outlines the measures of decision making used for analyzing the data.  Section 4 presents 
simple  OLS  regressions  predicting  the  measures  of  decision  making  as  a  function  of 
demographics.  Section 5 investigates the relationship between retirement wealth accumulation, 
health, and decision making.  Section 6 considers whether individuals rely on friends or experts 
and how that might affect the correlation between wealth and health.  Section 7 concludes.     5
 
2.  Decision Processes 
  The motivation for considering decision making processes comes from previous findings 
in the literature.  The importance of decision processes and planning has been discussed in the 
psychological literature (Gollwitzer 1999 and Gollwitzer et al. 2004).  In economics, several 
papers  have  shown  that  how  households  approach  retirement  planning  can  affect  wealth 
accumulation.  Those who plan for their retirement accumulate more wealth (Ameriks et al. 2003 
and Lusardi and Mitchell (2007).  In other work (Binswanger and Carman 2010), we show that 
both  sophisticated  planning  and  simple  rules  of  thumb  lead  to  higher  levels  of  wealth 
accumulation than having no systematic approach towards savings.   
This paper focuses on decision making in two domains: saving for retirement and health.  
In the domain of retirement savings we focus on choices about the accumulation of wealth.  In 
the domain of health, we consider a variety of choices about health insurance, long-term care 
insurance, research about health interventions, doctor visits, and diet.  In either case, how the 
person approaches decision making is likely to influence both health and wealth outcomes and 
the correlation between these outcomes.   
  Each of these choices involves many facets.  The consequences of the choices do not 
occur until the future and involve risk, the need to consider many possible outcomes, and the 
need to synthesize complex mathematical and scientific information.  For most people, neither 
finance nor medical science are their areas of expertise, thus choices in these domains require 
people to step beyond their normal skills and expertise.  As a consequence, the complexity of the 
decisions and the strategies used to tackle them may be similar across domains.   
  The  most  meticulous  and  conscientious  people  are  likely  to  address  decisions  very 
carefully in both domains and, as a result, make very sophisticated decisions.  For example they 
would research and possibly calculate the costs and benefits of their choices.  People who do 
care but are less thorough may decide to use a rule of thumb in both domains.  Finally, there are 
people who do not take care in making decisions.  These people may be more impulsive or make 
decisions arbitrarily without much thought.  Ultimately this may boil down to a combination of 
personality and ability.  If this is the case we expect similar decision processes in both domains.   
  We  would  expect  those  who  take  more  care  and  use  more  sophisticated  decision 
processes to achieve better outcomes than those who take little care.  Planning for retirement will   6
tend to lead to higher levels of retirement wealth than taking no particular approach.
3  Similarly 
we would expect those who are meticulous about healthy eating habits to enjoy better health than 
those  who  eat  whatever  appeals  to  them  at  the  moment.    Thus,  those  who  follow  a  more 
sophisticated decision process are likely to have better outcomes, regardless of the domain.   
  We define a decision process to consist of a series of steps that one takes to make a 
choice.  Decision processes differ in terms of the degree of their sophistication and therefore how 
costly  they  are  to  implement.    Gathering  detailed  information  either  about  retirement  plans, 
insurance, or the efficacy of treatment may require a substantial amount of time and effort.  In 
contrast, following a simple rule of thumb, such as a constant savings rate or just choosing the 
cheapest  alternative  does  not  require  a  large  time  investment.    Importantly,  the  costs  of 
researching  many  alternatives  may  differ  across  individuals.    It  may  require  little  effort  for 
someone with substantial mathematical or scientific training.  On the other hand, it may be very 
burdensome for people with low planning skills and to those with a high disutility of thinking 
about technical issues.   
  Decision processes should be distinguished from preferences over lifetime utility profiles.  
Intertemporal preferences determine the optimal choice of lifetime utility profiles.  However, 
since decision processes may be costly, some individuals may make choices that differ from the 
first-best choice that they would make if decision making were costless.   
  If sophisticated decision processes are effective and actually lead to better outcomes, then 
we would  expect individuals who  take  similar  steps in different  domains  to  achieve  similar 
outcomes in those domains.  If careful research is beneficial, then those who carefully research 
both retirement and health decisions can expect to have both better health and higher wealth; 
while those who do less research can expect worse outcome.  This would lead to a correlation 
between health and SES.   
  The paper most closely related to this one is Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2010) in that they 
also document factors that may help to explain the correlation between SES and health.  There 
are two main differences between our paper and theirs.  First, they focus on specific health 
behaviors and outcomes, such as smoking and obesity.  In contrast, we consider overall self-
reported health.  Second, they use education as their measure of SES and we use retirement 
wealth.    However,  Cutler  and  Lleras-Muney’s  strategy  is  similar  to  ours:  how  does  the 
                                                 
3 See Binswanger and Carman (2010).   7
correlation of  interest change when  we  control  for other related  factors.  Another  important 
difference is that they focus on the changes in coefficients in regressions when new controls are 
added.  We use this strategy as well, but also include a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to further 
estimate how each factor contributes to the overall correlation between wealth and health.   
Much of the literature on the correlation between SES and health, including Cutler and 
Lleras-Muney  2010  and  those  discussed  in  the  introduction,  has  focused  on  the  long-term 
relationship between the two variables.  For example, many papers have considered the effect of 
childhood on health at older ages.  This paper, in contrast, considers current retirement wealth 
accumulation  and  current  choices  regarding  health  care  financing,  health  care  and  health 
behaviors.  This allows us to consider the role of similarity in decision making in explaining the 
correlation between health and wealth.  Were we to focus on choices during childhood, it would 
likely be difficult for most people to remember what they had done.  More recent choices are 
more likely to be salient.   
Another closely related paper is Khwaja et al. (2007b).  They investigate whether or not 
financial planning is related to smoking planning.  They find that while financial planning does 
predict wealth, it does not relate to smoking planning.  The key similarity in Khwaja et al. 2007b 
and our paper is the relationship between financial planning and health.  However, they focus on 
a very specific type of health planning: planning to smoke.  Because smoking is addictive, the 
nature of planning to smoke may be very different from planning in other areas of health. 
   
3.  Data 
  Our data come from a survey module fielded in the RAND American Life Panel (ALP).  
The ALP is an Internet panel where respondents fill out questionnaires online.
4  Our module was 
fielded in August 2008.  All respondents in our sample participate in the labor market.  The ALP 
provides us with information on respondents’ background characteristics such as age, gender, 
education, etc.  Our sample includes 653 observations.  Table 1 includes summary statistics of 
the main demographic characteristics of our sample.  Our sample is slightly older and better 
                                                 
4 The respondents in the ALP are recruited from among individuals aged 18 and older who are respondents to the 
Monthly Survey (MS) of the University of Michigan' s Survey Research Center (SRC).  Those without internet 
access prior to participation in the panel are provided with internet access through WebTVs. Respondents are paid 
proportionally to the length of a questionnaire. For an interview of thirty minutes, a respondent typically obtains 
$20.   8
educated  than  the  general  population.    However,  this  may  be  a  more  relevant  group  for 
understanding retirement planning and wealth accumulation.   
  Table 1 also contains summary statistics for our main outcome variables.  As a measure 
of health, individuals report their self-reported health on a scale from excellent to poor.  Self-
reported health has been shown to be a reliable measure of health.
5  Nearly three fourths of the 
sample  report  to  be  in  excellent  or  good  health.    As  a  measure  of  wealth  we  use  wealth 
accumulated for the purposes of retirement.  While the mean wealth accumulated for retirement 
is $188,532, the median is considerably lower: $62,500. 
Retirement wealth, as opposed to overall financial wealth, is considered because it is 
more likely to be the result of an individual’s decision process.  One must choose to designate 
wealth as retirement wealth, usually in an IRA or 401(k) account.  Overall wealth may be the 
result of bequests and therefore less affected by decision processes.  While people may expect to 
receive a bequest, the size of that bequest (and therefore the impact on wealth) is often out of 
their control.  Thus overall wealth may be less related to decision processes.
6 
  Table 2 contains detailed information about the sophistication scores.  Several questions 
were asked in each of 6 decision making domains: retirement planning, long-term care insurance, 
health  insurance,  health  choices,  dietary  choices,  and  frequency  of  doctor  visits.    Table  2 
includes the exact wording of each of the questions.  These questions were written to identify 
those who take the most care in making a decision, those who take a moderate amount of care or 
use a simplified rule to make choices, and those who have a more carefree attitude towards 
making decisions.  For example, in the case of choices about health insurance: some carefully 
calculate the total expected cost of insurance including premiums and out of pocket expenditures.  
Others  simply  choose  the  plan  with  the  cheapest  premiums.    Still  others  seem  to  use  no 
systematic approach to selecting a plan.   
  For each domain, several questions were asked about how individuals made choices in 
the past.  They could respond to these questions using a 5 point scale: 1= strongly disagree to 
5=strongly agree.  The answers to these questions were then added together and normalized to 
range from zero to one so that all scores have a comparable magnitude.  In order to avoid 
acquiescence  response  bias,  some  statements  were  used  that  were  associated  with  less 
                                                 
5 See Idler and Benyamini (1997) for a review of studies on this topic. 
6 Our results are robust to using overall wealth, not wealth accumulated for retirement.  These results are available 
from the authors.   9
sophisticated decision making.  These statements then were subtracted from the overall score for 
the domain.  An overall average score, the average across each of the 6 domains, was also 
calculated.  Table 2 also includes summary statistics for each question and score.  The table also 
reports the formulas used to calculate each score.  Scores are reported in the last row of each 
panel.  Figure 1 depicts the distribution of each of the 7 scores.  All 7 scores, including the 
average, exhibit similar distributions, with middle values being more common than extremes.   
  While  the  selection  of  specific  scores  is  subjective,  our  results  are  robust  to  other 
definitions of scores or including each question separately in the regressions.  We use scores in 
our analysis because this eases the interpretation of the answer to our main research question: do 
decision making processes contribute to the correlation between wealth and health.   
  The 6 decision making domains investigated here represent both financial choices and 
choices about health related behaviors.  The retirement planning, long-term care insurance and 
health  insurance  domains  represent  financial  choices.    Health  choices,  dietary  choices,  and 
choices about the frequency of doctor visits represent behavioral choices.  Because they combine 
financial and health choices, long-term care insurance and health insurance choices are likely to 
fall somewhere between the retirement planning domains and the health domains.   
Questions about health insurance were only asked to a limited sample.  Roughly 45% of 
our sample reported that they had insurance purchased through their employer and that their 
employer offered only one choice of health insurance policies.  These individuals were not asked 
additional  questions  about  their  decision  making  process.    For  these  individuals,  the  choice 
regarding health insurance was relatively simple and not likely to depend on the sophistication of 
decision making processes.  While these individuals might have considered insurance purchased 
on the private market, rarely would this be a financially attractive option.  The single health 
insurance package offered by their employer is likely a dominant alternative. 
 
4.  Correlates of Decision Processes 
  This  section  examines  which  people  have  the  highest  sophistication  scores.    We 
investigate which demographic characteristics are most associated with the sophistication scores.  
In addition, we examine the correlation between scores.   
  Table  3  presents  the  results  of  7  regressions  predicting  each  of  the  various  scores, 
including the average across all six areas.  We include homeownership as a proxy for income,   10
and education as a proxy for income and cognitive ability.  For the most part, higher levels of 
education are associated with higher scores.  Men are more likely to have higher scores for 
retirement planning; women are  more likely to have higher scores  for  choices about health, 
choices  about  diet  and  choices  about  the  frequency  of  doctor  visits.    Homeownership  is 
associated with more sophisticated decision making for the financial choices, perhaps because 
homeownership often  requires  a  mortgage,  which  can  involve  complicated decision  making.  
Other variables are not significant.   
  Table 4 considers the correlation in decision making between the retirement planning 
domain and all other domains.  Each column represents a separate regression predicting the 
sophistication score for the retirement planning domain.  For example, the first column contains 
sophistication in decision making in the long-term care domain as an explanatory variable.  In all 
cases, the coefficients on the other controls remain roughly the same as those in Table 3: men, 
homeowners, and those with more education use more sophisticated decision making processes.  
More sophisticated decision making in the retirement planning domain is associated with more 
sophisticated decision making in each of the five health domains.  Increasing the sophistication 
score  in  one  of  the  health  decision  domains  from  0  to  1  is  associated  with  increasing  the 
retirement planning score by 0.06 to 0.39; the strongest relationships are for health insurance and 
health research domains and the least for frequency of doctor visits.  For any sophistication 
score, an increase of 0.05 to 0.1 is equivalent to moving up one step on a 5-point Likert scale, for 
example, from agree to strongly agree for one question.   
The correlation in decision making is statistically significant in all cases.  This suggests 
that those who use more sophisticated decision making processes in one domain are likely to do 
so in other domains.  Similar decision making processes may help to explain the correlation 
between wealth and health, which we turn to in the next section.   
 
5.  Decision Making Processes, Health and Wealth 
  This section examines how decision making processes influence the correlation between 
health and wealth.  First we investigate whether or not decisions making processes affect health 
and/or wealth independently.  Then we turn to the joint relationship between wealth and health.   
  Table  5  examines  the  determinants  of  self-reported  health.    Here  we  see  that 
homeownership (which proxies for SES) is associated with higher levels of self-reported health.    11
Relative to those with only a high school education, those with some college have worse health.  
Other control variables are not significant.  The sophistication of decision making does play an 
important role.  Each regression considers sophistication in a different domain.  The first column 
examines the relationship between self-reported health and the average sophistication score.  An 
increase in the average sophistication score from zero to one would increase self reported health 
by 0.96 points on a scale from one to five, suggesting that the most sophisticated decision makers 
report nearly 1 full point better health on a five point scale, even when controlling for education.  
If we consider the individual measures of sophistication, we see that health choices and dietary 
choices have the largest impact on health, but choices in financial domains (with the exception of 
health insurance)  are  still  significant.    This  suggests  that  those  who  are  more  able  to  make 
complex choices, even controlling for education, enjoy better health.  The effects of financial 
choices on health tend to be smaller than the effects of health choices, this could occur because 
financial choices don’t directly influence health, but rather serve as a proxy for decision making 
in the health domain.  Nevertheless, the coefficients on financial choices are still sizeable. 
  Table  6  considers  the  effect  of  decision  making  on  the  accumulation  of  wealth  for 
retirement.  Wealth accumulation is positively associated with gender, homeownership, marital 
status, and education.  Again, the sophistication of decision making plays an important role.  As 
in Table 5, each regression considers sophistication in a different domain.  The first column 
examines the relationship between wealth and the average sophistication score.  An increase in 
the average sophistication score from zero to one would increase retirement wealth by 8.54 log 
points.  Moving from agree to strongly agree on one question is associated with a 23% percent 
increase in wealth.  While these effects seem large, the variation in wealth accumulated for 
retirement is very large.  The 25
th percentile is $10,000 and the 75
th percentile is $200,000.  If we 
consider the individual measures of sophistication, we see that retirement planning and health 
insurance choices have the largest impact on wealth, but choices in the other domains are still 
significant.    This  suggests  again  that  those  who  are  more  able  to  make  complex  choices, 
controlling for  education, enjoy higher wealth.   Similar to  the previous  table, the effects of 
financial choices on wealth tend to be larger than the effects of health choices; this likely occurs 
because health choices don’t directly influence wealth, but rather serve as a proxy for decision 
making in the wealth domain.     12
  The  next  three  tables  address  the  role  of  decision  making  on  the  joint  relationship 
between  wealth  and  health.    We  present  3  different  specifications  supporting  the  view  that 
decision making helps to explain the relationship between wealth and health.  In Table 7, we 
present OLS regressions that consider the impact of health on wealth (in logs).  Model 1, in the 
first column, does not control for decision making.  Here we see that a 1 point increase in health 
(on a 5 point scale) is associated with approximately a 38% percent increases retirement wealth.  
In the next seven columns we consider the effect of adding the decision making sophistication 
scores.  The addition of the sophistication scores tends to reduce the magnitude of the coefficient 
on self reported health, and at times that coefficient becomes insignificant.  The coefficient on 
health  is  reduced  by  up  to  62%  depending  on  the  specification,  with  the  largest  reduction 
associated  with  the  average  sophistication  score.    Because  the  average  score  combines 
information across multiple domains, it is likely to be the measure of decision making processes 
that exhibits the least noise. It is worth noting that the percentage reduction in the coefficient is 
not  necessarily  statistically  significant.    Furthermore,  this  methodology  makes  it  difficult  to 
measure the statistical  significance of  the contribution of decision making to  the correlation 
between  health  and  wealth;  therefore  we  consider  a  Blinder-Oaxaca  decomposition  below.  
However, the results suggest that the sophistication of decision making does indeed play a role in 
the  correlation  between  retirement  wealth  accumulation  and  health.    Those  who  use  more 
sophisticated decision making processes tend to be healthier and to accumulate more wealth for 
their retirement.   
  Table  8 presents  an instrumental variables  analysis.   We use decision  making in the 
health domain as an instrument for the retirement planning score.  Using decision making in the 
health domain as an instrument for retirement decision making allows us to focus on the part of 
decision making that is common across domains.  This common decision making process may 
reflect  fixed  personality  characteristics  or  cognition.    In  addition,  we  use  self-assessed 
mathematical  skills  as  an  instrument,  which  provides  an  exogenous  source  of  variation  in 
decision  making  in  complex  mathematical  problems,  as  described  in  Ameriks  et  al.  (2003).  
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 8 repeat the results from columns 1 and 3 in Table 7 for comparison.  
Comparing  column  1,  the  OLS  results  without  controlling  for  retirement  sophistication,  to 
column 3, the IV results controlling for retirement sophistication, we see that common aspects of 
sophistication across domains again reduce the impact of health on wealth.  Comparing columns   13
2 and 3, OLS and IV with sophistication scores, there is no economically significant difference.  
The  IV  strategy  reduces  the  coefficient on  retirement  planning  to  measure  the effect  of  the 
variation in retirement planning that is explained by variation in decision making processes in 
health.  The sophistication score is significant in both the OLS and IV, which shows that it is not 
merely endogeneity between wealth and financial planning causing the statistical significance.  
  Tables 7 and 8 suggest that decision making processes influence the correlation between 
wealth and health.  Those who use sophisticated decision process have better outcomes in both 
domains.  But this analysis does not allow us to fully measure the contribution decision making 
processes make to the correlation.  A Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition can be used to quantify 
what proportion of a correlation can be attributed to observable and unobservable factors and to 
test  the  statistical  significance  of  this  contribution  (Blinder  1973  and  Oaxaca  1973).    The 
decomposition provides the strongest evidence of the contribution of decision making processes 
to the correlation between health and wealth. 
  Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions are typically used to explain differences in wages across 
groups, such as genders.  Differences between groups can then be attributed to an explained 
portion, due to their observable characteristics, and an unexplained portion, which can be due to 
unobservable  differences  or  in  the  case  of  the  labor  market,  discrimination.    In  our  case, 
differences  between  the  groups,  the  healthy  and  the  less  healthy,  can  be  attributed  to  an 
explained part due to observable characteristics, such as the sophistication of decision making 
and demographic characteristics, or an unexplained part.  The unexplained part may be due to 
unobservable characteristics, as is normally the case with a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, or 
due to the causal link between health and SES status.  In particular, there may be a direct causal 
relationship because those who are in better health can anticipate a longer life expectancy and 
therefore  have  greater  need  for  retirement  wealth  accumulation.    With  a  Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition, everything that is not explained by the observed characteristics is attributed to 
the unexplained part.  If there is a direct causal link between health and SES then this will not be 
picked up by the observed characteristics and, as a result, will end up in the unexplained part. 
  We  conduct  a  Blinder-Oaxaca  decomposition  that  investigates  what  portion  of  the 
difference between the wealth of the healthy and the wealth of the less healthy is explained by 
differences in decision making sophistication.  Here, we separate our sample into two groups 
based  on  their  health.    The  less  healthy  group  reports  health  to  be  poor,  fair  or  good,  and   14
represents  one  fourth  of  our  sample.    The  healthy  group  reports  health  to  be  very  good  or 
excellent, and represents three fourths of our sample.   
  Table  9  presents  the  results  of  this  analysis.    The  difference  in  retirement  wealth 
accumulation for the healthy versus the less healthy is 1.188 log points.  The first column shows 
that if we do not control for decision making, only 48% of the relationship between health and 
wealth accumulation is accounted for.  When we add the average sophistication score in the 
second column, this jumps to 83%.  In addition, 44% of the total difference can be attributed to 
differences  in  the  average  sophistication  score.    This  suggests  that  nearly  one  half  of  the 
relationship between retirement wealth accumulation and health can be attributed to decision 
making.  The average sophistication score is the best measure of decision making because it 
combines information across domains and thus is likely to capture more fully the individual’s 
overall approach to decision making.  This is our preferred specification.  In fact, the proportion 
explained by the average score (44%) is greater than the proportion explained by any of the 
individual scores.   
  The other six columns consider the individual decision making scores in each separate 
domain.  Column 3 considers retirement planning sophistication.  The total explained portion of 
the difference decreases form 83% in column 2 to 68% in column 3.  Here, 27% of the difference 
in the wealth of the healthy vs. the less healthy can be attributed to difference in retirement 
planning.  This is still a sizeable contribution and suggests that decision making in the specific 
domains  also  contributes  to  the  difference  in  health  and  retirement  wealth  accumulation.  
Considering columns 4 through 8 confirms this observation.  While retirement planning has a 
large  effect,  the  other  domains  also  contribute,  although  the  differences  are  not  always 
significant.  One notable case is health insurance sophistication which does explain a 35% of the 
difference  for  the  subset  of  the  population  for  whom  we  can  measure  health  insurance 
sophistication.   
  Taken all together the results of Tables 7 through 9 suggest that decision making does 
influence the relationship between health and retirement wealth accumulation.  The Blinder-
Oaxaca decompositions suggest that the role of decision making is quite large.  We find that 
more variation is explained when we consider the average sophistication score across domains 
rather than any of the domain-specific sophistication scores.  These sophistication scores were 
designed to measure the degree of research, planning, and calculations that go into decision   15
making in each domain.  Of course, all are measured with some error, thus the average may 
explain  more  of  the  variation  because  it  comes  closer  to  measuring  the  “true”  underlying 
personality trait or decision process.   
 
6.  The Role of Friends and Experts 
  So  far,  we  have  considered  the  role  of  one  aspect  of  the  decision  making  process, 
focusing on the degree of sophistication and complexity of decision making.  However, there are 
many possible routes that one may take towards a decision.  Those who are less willing or able to 
make sophisticated decisions, as described above, may rely on others to help them to make 
choices.  This could occur in both the health and financial domain.  If you are uncertain of the 
best  investment  strategy,  insurance  product,  or  health  behavior,  one  possibility  is  to  turn  to 
friends or experts for help.  In addition, those who feel unable to evaluate their options may turn 
to advisors.  Alternatively, it is also possible that the people who seek advice are those who are 
sophisticated enough to realize that they could benefit from help.  Individuals who regularly seek 
advice could have better outcomes in multiple domains, if they are able to find good advisors, 
and if they are able to find these advisors in multiple domains.  These behaviors might also 
contribute to the correlation between SES and health.   
Our  survey  also  included  questions  about  individuals’  reliance  on  friends,  family  or 
colleagues in 3 domains (the retirement planning domain, the health insurance domain, and the 
health  choices  domain)  and  questions  about  individuals’  reliance  on  expert  advice  in  all  6 
domains.
7    For  the  financial  domain,  the  expert  could  be  a  financial  advisor  or  a  financial 
planning calculator.  The text of these questions is included in the appendix, Tables A1 and A2.  
The questions are all normalized to be measured on a scale from 0 to 1 to be comparable to the 
sophistication scores in the previous section.   
  Table 10 investigates which characteristics are correlated with talking to friends, family 
or co-workers about financial planning, health insurance, and health choices.  The first column 
considers the average of all three domains and the next three columns consider each domain 
separately.    Almost  none  of  the  variables  help  to  explain  talking  to  friends  about  these 
                                                 
7 Sample sizes vary across specifications.  Individuals who had never heard of long-term care insurance were not 
asked about reliance on experts.  Similarly those who had not seen a doctor in 5 years were excluded from questions 
about how closely they followed their doctor’s advice.  Again, those who reported no choices for health insurance 
were excluded from those questions.   16
complicated choices.  The most interesting result is that women are more likely to talk to their 
friends about health choices than men and men are more likely to talk to their friends about 
retirement planning than women, although the latter effect is not statistically significant.  The 
other coefficients are never significant.   
Table 11 shows that those who talk to their friends about health insurance or health 
choices also discuss financial planning.  As in Table 10, nearly all of the other coefficients are 
insignificant, except for the coefficients on homeowner and male, suggesting that men do talk 
more to friends and family members about retirement planning.   
  Tables 12 and 13 investigate whether those who talk to their friends have better health or 
more wealth.  Table 12 shows that relying on friends does not contribute to health, but columns 1 
and 2 of Table 13 suggest that talking to friends or family, especially about retirement planning, 
is associated with more wealth.   
Unlike the case of decision making sophistication, when looking at reliance on friends, 
we don’t see much of an impact of decision making on outcomes like health and wealth.  Table 
14 examines the effect of talking to friends on the joint relationship between wealth and health.  
Here we see the talking to friends does reduce the correlation between health and wealth but not 
nearly  as  much  as  seen  when  considering  the  effects  of  decision  making  in  Table  7.  
Disregarding the health insurance case, where neither coefficient is statistically significant, the 
coefficient on health drops by 10% or less when we control for reliance on friends.  While we 
can only speculate on why this is the case, it may be that most individuals do not have friends 
with  a  wide  enough  set  of  experiences  to  advise  on  both  health  and  savings  matters.  
Alternatively, the advice of friends and family may be of mixed quality; some may be beneficial 
but some may be detrimental.   
  In addition to relying on friends, one might turn to experts, such as financial planners, 
doctors, or diet gurus.  Relying on expert advice could take the form of speaking with an expert, 
or just relying on the recommendations of an expert from a website or book.  Table 15 examines 
which individuals are most likely to report relying on experts.  We see that relying on experts 
tends to increase with homeownership and education.  Men are more likely to rely on their 
doctor to make health decisions, and women are more likely to follow an expert diet.  Other 
effects are insignificant.     17
In Table 16, we consider correlations across domains.  We see that individuals who rely 
on experts for retirement planning are also likely to rely on experts when making choices about 
long-term care.  This is not surprising, since purchasing long-term care insurance often occurs as 
part of retirement planning.  Similarly, people who closely follow the advice of their doctor also 
closely follow the advice of their financial advisors.  However, we do not observe correlations in 
other domains.   
  Table 17 and 18 consider the effect of experts on health and wealth.  Table 17 shows that 
relying on experts has no relationship to health, except for how closely you follow your doctor’s 
suggestions.  In Table 18, relying on financial experts, for retirement planning or long-term care 
decisions, is associated with greater wealth as is relying on experts for diets.  Perhaps this is 
because the wealthy are more likely to diet and/or seek financial planning advice.   
Table  19,  like  Tables  7  and  14,  considers  whether  relying  on  experts  mitigates  the 
relationship between wealth and health.  As with relying on friends, expert advice doesn’t reduce 
the coefficient on health much, and even sometimes increases the correlation between health and 
retirement  wealth.    The  change  in  the  coefficient  ranges  from  -35%  to  16%  (excluding  the 
coefficient on health insurance which becomes insignificant due to sample size).  However these 
changes are not necessarily statistically significant.  To address is point, we again turn to the 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. 
Finally, Table 20 considers Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions like those in Table 9.  Here 
we find that relying on friends and experts does not contribute to explaining the relationship 
between wealth and health.  The percent change explained by these variables is small (1%-4%) 
and not statistically significant.  We present only specifications with the average reliance on 
friends  or  experts  across  domains  as  the  main  variable  of  interest.    Results  for  the  domain 
specific measures described n Tables A1 and A2 confirm there is no significant effect.  Thus 
while sophistication in decision making contributes to the correlation between health and wealth, 
reliance on friends, family and experts does not. 
  
7.  Conclusion 
  This paper considers how people address decision making in the domains of health and 
retirement planning.  These decisions are often complicated and a well-informed decision can 
require the acquisition and processing of complex information.  Some individuals may take the   18
time and care to research decisions; others make quick and simple choices; still others may rely 
on friends and experts.  If people use similar processes across domains we might expect those 
processes to help to explain the correlation between outcomes in different domains.   
  The results of this paper suggest that the sophisticated decision maker who searches out 
information and tries to evaluate that information will be both healthier and wealthier.  Based on 
a  Blinder-Oaxaca  decomposition,  sophistication  in  decision  making  explains  44%  of  the 
correlation between wealth and health.  In contrast, relying on friends and experts does not 
contribute to the relationship between health and wealth.  One explanation for the lack of an 
effect of relying on friends could be that individuals’ friendship networks tend not to be broad 
enough to improve both health and wealth.  This doesn’t imply that friends and experts can not 
positively contribute to health or financial decisions, but rather that they don’t explain the joint 
relationship between health and wealth.  For example, people who have friends that are very 
helpful in the health domain may not also know people who are helpful in the financial domain.  
Perhaps doctors and financial advisors tend not to socialize in the same circles.   
  A large literature has been devoted to understanding the correlation between SES status 
and health.  While most of the literature focuses on identifying a causal relationship where health 
causes higher SES status or SES status causes better health, some literature has considered the 
possibility that a third factor, such as decision making, discount rates or risk attitudes, influences 
both.   
  The  role  of  decision  making  in  the  relationship  between  health  and  wealth  could 
represent discount rates.  Those who place a high weight on the future, are likely to save for their 
retirement, protect their health, and be willing to engage in tedious research to determine the best 
course  of  action  in  these  complicated  domains.    While  this  may  contribute  to  our  results, 
previous literature suggests the effect of discount rates is small.
8 
  The fact that we see a strong correlation in decision making across domains suggests that 
how  people  approach  complex  decisions  may  be  a  fundamental  personality  trait  or  may  be 
related to cognitive ability in a way that can not be controlled for with education.  Those who are 
conscientious or for whom the costs of gathering and processing information are low can expect 
to achieve better outcomes in multiple domains.  Those who think carefully about all of the 
decisions they face, may achieve better outcomes.  The person who simplifies decisions may end 
                                                 
8 Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2010).   19
up  less  well  off.    Finally,  ignoring  complex  issues  complete  is  likely  to  lead  to  the  worst 
outcomes.   
The paper most related to ours is Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2010); however our results 
differ significantly from theirs.  While their methodology, and even some of their measures that 
may mitigate the relationship between SES and health, are similar to ours, their measures of SES 
and health are different.  They focus on education while we consider wealth; they focus on health 
behaviors while we consider general self-reported health.  They find no evidence that planning 
plays a significant role in mitigating the relationship between SES and health, while we find that 
decision making plays a statistically and economically significant role.  The difference in these 
results is likely attributable to the different measures of SES and health.  Our measure of health 
is more general and thus may pick up factors that influence health through different channels for 
different individuals.  And our measure of SES is closely related to current behavior while their 
measure, education, was completed years earlier for most survey respondents.  Finally, they find 
a significant effect of social support while we find no effect of relying on friends and family for 
advice.  This suggests that it is not the transfer of information that leads to the mitigation of the 
relationship between health and SES; rather it may be a general effect of social capital.   
Our results suggest that the use of sophisticated decision making processes can explain 
44% of the correlation between wealth and health.  How people approach decisions influences 
the relationship between SES and health, however our data do not allow us to precisely describe 
the causal mechanism.  It may be that merely the act of making a careful decision can lead to 
better outcomes.  Or it may be that this represents a fundamental personality trait.  These are 
important topics for future research.   20
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
Variable   Mean  Std.  Dev.   
Self-reported health  3.940  0.782 
     % Excellent  23.43   
     % Very good  51.3   
     % Good  21.29   
     % Fair  3.83   
     % Poor  0.15   
Wealth for retirement  191,826  366,025 
Ln wealth for retirement  10.001  3.616 
Age   47.605  10.274 
Home owner   0.783  0.413 
Married   0.675  0.469 
Male   0.485  0.500 
% With some college   0.328  0.470 
% with college degree   0.302  0.459 
% with advanced degree   0.240  0.428 
     
Sample size  653   
Note: Self-reported health is measured on a scale from 1=poor to 5=excellent 
   24
Table 2 Sophistication Scores 
Name  Question  Mean  Std.  Dev.    Median 
Financial Domain 
retneeds  I' ve tried to determine my financial needs during retirement.    3.364  1.245  4 
savper  I have a savings target of regularly saving some percentage of my income, e.g.  5, 10, 15, or .  .  .  .  percent.    3.370  1.491  4 
savamt  I have a savings target of regularly saving some amount of money, such as e.g.  $100, $500, $1000 or .  .  .  per month.    3.110  1.482  3 
sophret  Retirement Planning Sophistication Score: (retneeds+max(savper,savamt)-2)/8  0.636  0.268  0.75 
Long-term Care 
ltcneeds  I spent time calculating my expected needs for long-term care.    2.178  1.183  2 
ltcnever  I never thought about long-term care insurance.    2.421  1.219  2 
ltcdk  I don' t know anything about long-term care insurance.    2.650  1.276  2 
sophltc  Long-Term Care Sophistication Score: (ltcneeds+(6-ltcnever)+(6-ltcdk)-3)/12  0.464  0.267  0.5 
Health Insurance Domain (Sample limited n=394) 
hicalc  I calculated the annual costs of insurance premiums and my out-of-pocket costs to figure out which plan would be 
cheapest.    3.033  1.415  3 
hiloprem  I chose the plan that had the lowest monthly premiums.    2.652  1.362  2 
hilopock  I chose the plan that had the lowest out-of-pocket costs.    2.856  1.284  3 
hnotworth  Given the costs of health insurance, I don' t think it' s worth it for me.    3.042  1.515  3 
Sophhi  Health Insurance Domain Sophistication Score: (hicalc+6-max(hiloprem, hilopock)+(6-hnotworth)-3)/12  0.595  0.204  0.667 
Health Choices 
hresearch  When I have to make a decision about health care, I do a lot of research to find out what all of the options are, e.g. on 
the internet or in the library.    3.889  1.054  4 
hlife  I think that I lead a healthy lifestyle without making too much effort.    3.187  1.082  3 
sophhc  Health Choices Sophistication Score: (hresearch+hlife-2)/8  0.635  0.189  0.625 
Dietary Choices 
dccount  I count calories.    2.412  1.305  2 
dccareful  I am careful about what I eat.    3.671  1.002  4 
dcworry  I don' t worry about what I eat.    2.349  1.143  2 
sophdc  Dietary Choices Sophistication Score: (dccountcal+dceatcarf+6-dcworry-3)/12  0.561  0.221  0.583 
Doctor Visits 
docyear  I go to the doctor every year or every couple of years for a check-up.    4.037  1.387  5 
docavoid  I only go to the doctor if something is wrong.    2.837  1.500  3 
sophdv  Doctor Visits Sophistication Score: (docyear+6-docavoid-2)/8  0.650  0.303  0.625 
Average Sophistication 
soph  Average Sophistication Score: Average of sophret, sophltc, sophhi(when measured), sophhc, sophdc, sophdv  0.590  0.141  0.597 
Note: All questions are measure with a Likert scale with 1=fully disagree to 5=fully agree.  All sophistication scores are calculated to range from 0 to 1.   25
Table 3 OLS Regressions Predicting Scores in Each Domain 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
Dependent Variable  Average Sophistication  Retirement  Long-term Care  Health Insurance  Health Research  Diet  Doctor Visits 
               
Age  -0.002  -0.007  -0.008  0.007  -0.002  0.006  0.003 
  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.008) 
Age squared  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Home owner  0.069***  0.103***  0.090***  0.107***  0.035*  0.016  0.082*** 
  (0.016)  (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.030)  (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.031) 
Married  0.013  0.038  0.002  0.057**  -0.021  0.011  0.016 
  (0.012)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.027) 
Male  -0.016  0.036*  -0.003  -0.034*  -0.008  -0.035**  -0.055** 
  (0.011)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.023) 
Dummy for some college   0.043**  0.075**  0.077**  0.010  -0.002  -0.002  0.070* 
  (0.018)  (0.035)  (0.033)  (0.039)  (0.026)  (0.030)  (0.039) 
Dummy for college degree   0.062***  0.066*  0.118***  0.035  0.033  0.050*  0.053 
  (0.018)  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.039)  (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.040) 
Dummy for advanced degree   0.074***  0.103***  0.110***  0.080**  0.023  0.054*  0.066 
  (0.019)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.038)  (0.027)  (0.031)  (0.041) 
Constant  0.464***  0.558***  0.391**  0.292*  0.621***  0.369***  0.376** 
  (0.082)  (0.157)  (0.153)  (0.172)  (0.099)  (0.132)  (0.172) 
               
Observations  653  653  653  379  653  653  653 
R-squared  0.115  0.064  0.064  0.127  0.016  0.029  0.056 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4 OLS Regressions Investigating the Correlation of Decision Processes across Domains 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
           
Score for long-term care  0.245***         
  (0.039)         
Score for health insurance    0.388***       
    (0.069)       
Score for health research      0.266***     
      (0.056)     
Score for diet        0.219***   
        (0.049)   
Score doctor visits          0.060* 
          (0.035) 
Age  -0.005  0.003  -0.007  -0.009  -0.007 
  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Age squared  0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Home owner  0.081***  0.097***  0.093***  0.099***  0.098*** 
  (0.028)  (0.035)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.029) 
Married  0.037  0.008  0.044*  0.036  0.037 
  (0.023)  (0.029)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Male  0.037*  0.054**  0.038*  0.043**  0.039* 
  (0.020)  (0.027)  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
Dummy for some college   0.057  0.105**  0.076**  0.076**  0.071** 
  (0.035)  (0.049)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.035) 
Dummy for college degree   0.037  0.056  0.057*  0.055  0.063* 
  (0.035)  (0.047)  (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.035) 
Dummy for advanced degree   0.076**  0.086*  0.097***  0.091**  0.099*** 
  (0.035)  (0.049)  (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.036) 
Constant  0.462***  0.149  0.392**  0.477***  0.536*** 
  (0.150)  (0.221)  (0.156)  (0.156)  (0.158) 
           
Observations  653  379  653  653  653 
R-squared  0.120  0.163  0.099  0.096  0.069 
Note: Dependent variable in all models is Retirement Planning Sophistication Score. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   27
Table 5 OLS Regressions Predicting Self-Reported Health 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
Average sophistication  0.958***             
  (0.238)             
Score for retirement planning    0.308**           
    (0.120)           
Score for long-term care      0.246**         
      (0.119)         
Score for health insurance        0.320       
        (0.220)       
Score for health research          0.981***     
          (0.163)     
Score for diet            0.477***   
            (0.152)   
Score doctor visits              -0.090 
              (0.103) 
Age  -0.010  -0.010  -0.010  -0.010  -0.010  -0.015  -0.012 
  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.032)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Age squared  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Home owner  0.184**  0.218**  0.228***  0.164  0.215**  0.242***  0.257*** 
  (0.087)  (0.089)  (0.088)  (0.111)  (0.084)  (0.086)  (0.088) 
Married  0.069  0.069  0.081  0.138  0.102  0.076  0.082 
  (0.073)  (0.074)  (0.074)  (0.097)  (0.072)  (0.073)  (0.074) 
Male  -0.065  -0.092  -0.080  -0.089  -0.073  -0.064  -0.085 
  (0.060)  (0.061)  (0.061)  (0.084)  (0.059)  (0.061)  (0.062) 
Dummy for some college   -0.230**  -0.212**  -0.208**  -0.222  -0.187*  -0.188*  -0.182* 
  (0.102)  (0.102)  (0.103)  (0.152)  (0.098)  (0.100)  (0.103) 
Dummy for college degree   -0.008  0.031  0.023  -0.018  0.019  0.028  0.057 
  (0.102)  (0.101)  (0.104)  (0.148)  (0.097)  (0.100)  (0.102) 
Dummy for advanced degree   -0.071  -0.032  -0.027  -0.048  -0.022  -0.026  0.006 
  (0.105)  (0.104)  (0.105)  (0.151)  (0.099)  (0.102)  (0.104) 
Constant  3.614***  3.886***  3.962***  3.863***  3.449***  3.883***  4.092*** 
  (0.538)  (0.532)  (0.526)  (0.747)  (0.525)  (0.526)  (0.524) 
               
Observations  653  653  653  379  653  653  653 
R-squared  0.065  0.050  0.046  0.047  0.094  0.057  0.040 
Note: Dependent variable in all models is Self-reported health. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6 OLS Regressions Predicting Log of Wealth 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
Average sophistication  8.541***             
  (1.010)             
Score for retirement planning    5.144***           
    (0.542)           
Score for long-term care      2.295***         
      (0.498)         
Score for health insurance        6.292***       
        (1.093)       
Score for health research          1.201*     
          (0.687)     
Score for diet            1.204**   
            (0.577)   
Score doctor visits              1.208*** 
              (0.464) 
Age  0.116  0.138*  0.119  0.227  0.103  0.094  0.098 
  (0.089)  (0.082)  (0.094)  (0.140)  (0.097)  (0.097)  (0.098) 
Age squared  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Home owner  2.054***  2.115***  2.437***  1.975***  2.602***  2.625***  2.545*** 
  (0.396)  (0.390)  (0.420)  (0.536)  (0.428)  (0.428)  (0.424) 
Married  0.615**  0.530*  0.721**  0.170  0.751**  0.712**  0.707** 
  (0.292)  (0.283)  (0.306)  (0.372)  (0.310)  (0.311)  (0.307) 
Male  0.658***  0.338  0.530**  1.070***  0.532**  0.565**  0.589** 
  (0.237)  (0.233)  (0.252)  (0.324)  (0.255)  (0.254)  (0.253) 
Dummy for some college   0.216  0.195  0.407  1.538**  0.586  0.585  0.499 
  (0.505)  (0.482)  (0.522)  (0.740)  (0.512)  (0.515)  (0.511) 
Dummy for college degree   0.968*  1.160**  1.231**  2.025***  1.460***  1.441***  1.436*** 
  (0.500)  (0.477)  (0.520)  (0.722)  (0.506)  (0.511)  (0.502) 
Dummy for advanced degree   1.911***  2.013***  2.290***  3.010***  2.515***  2.478***  2.462*** 
  (0.490)  (0.468)  (0.504)  (0.706)  (0.490)  (0.496)  (0.487) 
Constant  -0.919  0.171  2.144  -3.343  2.295  2.597  2.587 
  (1.951)  (1.749)  (2.032)  (3.141)  (2.142)  (2.094)  (2.113) 
               
Observations  653  653  653  379  653  653  653 
R-squared  0.313  0.352  0.243  0.350  0.220  0.221  0.225 
Note: Dependent variable in all models is log of wealth accumulated for retirement. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7 OLS Regressions Investigating the Relationship between Wealth and Health 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
                 
Self-reported health  0.384**  0.145  0.205  0.322*  0.271  0.333*  0.344*  0.401** 
  (0.178)  (0.165)  (0.154)  (0.176)  (0.196)  (0.180)  (0.183)  (0.178) 
Average sophistication    8.402***             
    (1.009)             
Score for retirement planning      5.081***           
      (0.539)           
Score for long-term care        2.216***         
        (0.502)         
Score for health insurance          6.205***       
          (1.077)       
Score for health research            0.874     
            (0.692)     
Score for diet              1.040*   
              (0.592)   
Score doctor visits                1.245*** 
                (0.461) 
Age  0.105  0.117  0.140*  0.122  0.230*  0.106  0.099  0.102 
  (0.097)  (0.089)  (0.082)  (0.094)  (0.139)  (0.097)  (0.097)  (0.098) 
Age squared  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Home owner  2.548***  2.028***  2.070***  2.363***  1.931***  2.530***  2.542***  2.442*** 
  (0.436)  (0.402)  (0.396)  (0.425)  (0.537)  (0.435)  (0.435)  (0.432) 
Married  0.694**  0.605**  0.516*  0.695**  0.133  0.717**  0.686**  0.673** 
  (0.309)  (0.293)  (0.284)  (0.305)  (0.378)  (0.309)  (0.310)  (0.305) 
Male  0.553**  0.668***  0.357  0.555**  1.095***  0.556**  0.587**  0.624** 
  (0.256)  (0.238)  (0.234)  (0.252)  (0.324)  (0.255)  (0.254)  (0.252) 
Dummy for some college   0.656  0.249  0.239  0.474  1.598**  0.648  0.650  0.572 
  (0.515)  (0.508)  (0.486)  (0.524)  (0.742)  (0.515)  (0.518)  (0.512) 
Dummy for college degree   1.481***  0.969*  1.154**  1.223**  2.030***  1.454***  1.431***  1.413*** 
  (0.507)  (0.501)  (0.477)  (0.520)  (0.721)  (0.507)  (0.511)  (0.504) 
Dummy for advanced degree   2.542***  1.921***  2.019***  2.299***  3.023***  2.522***  2.486***  2.460*** 
  (0.492)  (0.491)  (0.469)  (0.505)  (0.707)  (0.492)  (0.497)  (0.489) 
Constant  1.482  -1.442  -0.624  0.867  -4.391  1.146  1.261  0.947 
  (2.228)  (2.093)  (1.860)  (2.140)  (3.252)  (2.244)  (2.223)  (2.252) 
                 
Reduction in coefficient on 
health from column 1    62%  47%  16%  29%  13%  10%  -4% 
Observations  653  653  653  653  379  653  653  653 
R-squared  0.222  0.314  0.354  0.247  0.353  0.224  0.226  0.233 
Note: Dependent variable in all models is log of wealth accumulated for retirement. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   30
Table 8 IV Regressions Investigating the Relationship between Wealth, Health and Retirement 
Sophistication 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 








Model type  OLS  OLS  IV  First Stage 
         
Self-reported health  0.384**  0.205  0.196  0.015 
  (0.178)  (0.154)  (0.169)  (0.014) 
Retirement planning sophistication    5.081***  5.228***   
    (0.539)  (1.827)   
Age  0.105  0.140*  0.143*  -0.008 
  (0.097)  (0.082)  (0.083)  (0.007) 
Age squared  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Home owner  2.548***  2.070***  2.037***  0.087*** 
  (0.436)  (0.396)  (0.421)  (0.028) 
Married  0.694**  0.516*  0.520*  0.034 
  (0.309)  (0.284)  (0.287)  (0.024) 
Male  0.553**  0.357  0.358  0.034 
  (0.256)  (0.234)  (0.248)  (0.021) 
Dummy for some college   0.656  0.239  0.225  0.080** 
  (0.515)  (0.486)  (0.516)  (0.034) 
Dummy for college degree   1.481***  1.154**  1.144**  0.044 
  (0.507)  (0.477)  (0.489)  (0.034) 
Dummy for advanced degree   2.542***  2.019***  2.016***  0.085** 
  (0.492)  (0.469)  (0.507)  (0.035) 
Health research  1.482  -0.624  -0.711  0.200 
  (2.228)  (1.860)  (1.986)  (0.162) 
Diet        0.192*** 
        (0.058) 
Doctor visits        0.169*** 
        (0.050) 
Math confidence        0.034 
        (0.035) 
Constant        0.030*** 
        (0.010) 
         
Reduction in coef. on health from 
column 1    47%  49%   
Observations  653  653  652  652 
R-squared  0.222  0.354  0.354  0.136 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   31
Table 9 Blinder-Oaxaca Decompositions Comparing Healthy and Less Healthy 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
Wealth if health is poor  9.113***  9.113***  9.113***  9.113***  9.152***  9.113***  9.113***  9.113*** 
  (0.308)  (0.308)  (0.308)  (0.308)  (0.397)  (0.308)  (0.308)  (0.308) 
Wealth if health is excellent or very good  10.301***  10.301***  10.301***  10.301***  10.274***  10.301***  10.301***  10.301*** 
  (0.156)  (0.156)  (0.156)  (0.156)  (0.219)  (0.156)  (0.156)  (0.156) 
Difference  -1.188***  -1.188***  -1.188***  -1.188***  -1.123**  -1.188***  -1.188***  -1.188*** 
  (0.345)  (0.345)  (0.345)  (0.345)  (0.454)  (0.345)  (0.345)  (0.345) 
                 
Amount explained  -0.571***  -0.989***  -0.808***  -0.673***  -0.794***  -0.658***  -0.633***  -0.582*** 
  (0.165)  (0.200)  (0.207)  (0.174)  (0.274)  (0.179)  (0.173)  (0.168) 
Percent explained  48%  83%  68%  57%  71%  55%  53%  49% 
                 
Amount unexplained  -0.617*  -0.199  -0.379  -0.514  -0.329  -0.530  -0.554*  -0.605* 
  (0.328)  (0.303)  (0.294)  (0.327)  (0.364)  (0.329)  (0.333)  (0.324) 
Percent unexplained  52%  17%  32%  44%  29%  45%  47%  51% 
                 
Amount explained by sophistication score    -0.526***  -0.315**  -0.136**  -0.398**  -0.090  -0.073  -0.032 
    (0.125)  (0.132)  (0.063)  (0.168)  (0.067)  (0.045)  (0.035) 
Percent explained by sophistication score    44%  27%  11%  35%  8%  6%  3% 
                 



















                 
Sample size  653  653  653  653  379  653  653  653 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   32
Table 10 OLS Regressions Predicting whether Individuals Rely on Friends and Family in 
Making Decisions 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Dependent Variable  Average of Rely 
on Friends and 
Family in all 
Three Domains 
Rely on Friends 
and Family in 
Financial Domain 
Rely on Friends 
and Family in 
Health Insurance 
Domain 
Rely on Friends 
and Family in 
Health Research  
Domain 
         
Age  0.002  -0.004  0.011  0.007 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.014)  (0.007) 
Age squared  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Home owner  -0.004  0.022  -0.029  -0.007 
  (0.021)  (0.030)  (0.052)  (0.024) 
Married  0.004  0.011  -0.017  -0.014 
  (0.019)  (0.025)  (0.041)  (0.023) 
Male  -0.007  0.029  0.024  -0.037* 
  (0.017)  (0.023)  (0.037)  (0.020) 
Dummy for some college   0.006  0.037  -0.040  -0.002 
  (0.027)  (0.039)  (0.068)  (0.034) 
Dummy for college degree   0.013  0.013  -0.042  0.020 
  (0.027)  (0.039)  (0.067)  (0.034) 
Dummy for advanced degree   -0.006  -0.008  -0.018  0.005 
  (0.028)  (0.039)  (0.069)  (0.034) 
Constant  0.456***  0.355**  0.242  0.607*** 
  (0.122)  (0.163)  (0.336)  (0.155) 
         
Observations  653  653  332  653 
R-squared  0.008  0.009  0.012  0.028 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11 OLS Regressions Investigating the Relationship between Relying on Friends and 
Family in Different Domains 
  Model 1  Model 2 
     
Rely on friends and family in health insurance domain  0.347***   
  (0.045)   
Rely on friends and family in health research  domain    0.258*** 
    (0.045) 
Age  -0.009  -0.006 
  (0.010)  (0.007) 
Age squared  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Home owner  0.077**  0.024 
  (0.038)  (0.029) 
Married  -0.048  0.015 
  (0.030)  (0.025) 
Male  0.081***  0.038* 
  (0.029)  (0.022) 
Dummy for some college   0.052  0.037 
  (0.063)  (0.038) 
Dummy for college degree   -0.047  0.007 
  (0.062)  (0.038) 
Dummy for advanced degree   -0.049  -0.009 
  (0.063)  (0.039) 
Constant  0.370  0.198 
  (0.233)  (0.166) 
     
Observations  332  653 
R-squared  0.225  0.059 
Note: Dependent variable in all models is Rely on friends and family in retirement planning.  Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12 OLS Regressions Predicting Self-Reported Health: The Effect of Friends and Family 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
         
Average of rely on friends and 
family in all three domains  0.136       
  (0.143)       
Rely on friends and family in 
retirement planning domain    0.142     
    (0.107)     
Rely on friends and family in 
health insurance domain      0.006   
      (0.131)   
Rely on friends and family in 
health research domain        0.083 
        (0.126) 
Age  -0.012  -0.011  -0.013  -0.012 
  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.035)  (0.024) 
Age squared  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Home owner  0.251***  0.247***  0.177  0.251*** 
  (0.088)  (0.088)  (0.124)  (0.088) 
Married  0.081  0.079  0.099  0.082 
  (0.074)  (0.074)  (0.101)  (0.074) 
Male  -0.080  -0.085  -0.050  -0.077 
  (0.061)  (0.061)  (0.088)  (0.062) 
Dummy for some college   -0.189*  -0.194*  -0.292*  -0.188* 
  (0.102)  (0.102)  (0.164)  (0.102) 
Dummy for college degree   0.050  0.050  -0.105  0.050 
  (0.102)  (0.101)  (0.158)  (0.102) 
Dummy for advanced degree   0.001  0.001  -0.130  -0.000 
  (0.104)  (0.103)  (0.161)  (0.104) 
Constant  3.996***  4.008***  4.123***  4.008*** 
  (0.527)  (0.522)  (0.802)  (0.531) 
         
Observations  653  653  332  653 
R-squared  0.040  0.042  0.032  0.040 
Note: Dependent variable in all models is Self-reported health. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13 OLS Regressions Predicting log of Wealth: The Effect of Friends and Family 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
         
Average of rely on friends and family in all 
three domains  1.515**       
  (0.590)       
Rely on friends and family in retirement 
planning domain    2.071***     
    (0.429)     
Rely on friends and family in health 
insurance domain      0.443   
      (0.453)   
Rely on friends and family in health 
research domain        -0.390 
        (0.514) 
Age  0.097  0.109  0.149  0.104 
  (0.097)  (0.094)  (0.150)  (0.097) 
Age squared  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Home owner  2.650***  2.599***  1.958***  2.642*** 
  (0.427)  (0.421)  (0.561)  (0.430) 
Married  0.720**  0.703**  0.468  0.720** 
  (0.308)  (0.304)  (0.350)  (0.310) 
Male  0.533**  0.463*  1.157***  0.508** 
  (0.255)  (0.253)  (0.306)  (0.258) 
Dummy for some college   0.574  0.507  1.686**  0.582 
  (0.509)  (0.503)  (0.763)  (0.514) 
Dummy for college degree   1.481***  1.474***  1.885**  1.508*** 
  (0.502)  (0.497)  (0.745)  (0.506) 
Dummy for advanced degree   2.552***  2.559***  2.909***  2.544*** 
  (0.486)  (0.481)  (0.733)  (0.491) 
Constant  2.350  2.306  1.720  3.278 
  (2.131)  (2.048)  (3.396)  (2.116) 
         
Observations  653  653  332  653 
R-squared  0.224  0.243  0.248  0.217 
Note: Dependent variable in all models is log of wealth accumulated for retirement. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 14 OLS Regressions Predicting log of Wealth: The Effect of Friends and Family and 
Health 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
           
Self-reported health  0.384**  0.369**  0.344**  0.006  0.388** 
  (0.178)  (0.179)  (0.172)  (0.170)  (0.178) 
Average of rely on friends and family 
in all three domains    1.464**       
    (0.595)       
Rely on friends and family in 
retirement planning domain      2.022***     
      (0.427)     
Rely on friends and family in health 
insurance domain        0.443   
        (0.454)   
Rely on friends and family in health 
research domain          -0.422 
          (0.517) 
Age  0.105  0.102  0.113  0.149  0.108 
  (0.097)  (0.097)  (0.094)  (0.150)  (0.097) 
Age squared  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Home owner  2.548***  2.558***  2.515***  1.957***  2.544*** 
  (0.436)  (0.434)  (0.428)  (0.566)  (0.437) 
Married  0.694**  0.690**  0.675**  0.467  0.688** 
  (0.309)  (0.307)  (0.303)  (0.355)  (0.309) 
Male  0.553**  0.563**  0.493*  1.157***  0.538** 
  (0.256)  (0.255)  (0.253)  (0.306)  (0.257) 
Dummy for some college   0.656  0.644  0.574  1.688**  0.656 
  (0.515)  (0.511)  (0.506)  (0.768)  (0.516) 
Dummy for college degree   1.481***  1.463***  1.457***  1.886**  1.489*** 
  (0.507)  (0.504)  (0.499)  (0.745)  (0.507) 
Dummy for advanced degree   2.542***  2.551***  2.559***  2.910***  2.544*** 
  (0.492)  (0.487)  (0.483)  (0.734)  (0.493) 
Constant  1.482  0.874  0.928  1.695  1.723 
  (2.228)  (2.251)  (2.171)  (3.452)  (2.212) 
           
Reduction in coef. on health from 
column 1    4%  10%  98%  -1% 
Observations  653  653  653  332  653 
R-squared  0.222  0.230  0.248  0.248  0.223 
Note: Dependent variable in all models is log of wealth accumulated for retirement. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   37
Table 15 OLS Regressions Predicting Who Relies on Experts 

































               
Age  -0.003  -0.013  -0.006  0.015  -0.007  -0.004  0.007 
  (0.004)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.013)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Age squared  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Home owner  0.044***  0.137***  0.054*  -0.032  0.042  -0.012  0.016 
  (0.014)  (0.035)  (0.032)  (0.047)  (0.027)  (0.030)  (0.026) 
Married  0.020  0.037  0.010  0.040  0.003  0.030  0.023 
  (0.013)  (0.033)  (0.029)  (0.039)  (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.024) 
Male  -0.001  -0.001  -0.010  0.039  0.052***  -0.066***  0.006 
  (0.011)  (0.030)  (0.026)  (0.035)  (0.020)  (0.024)  (0.020) 
Dummy for some college   0.025  0.015  0.056  -0.029  0.036  0.043  -0.019 
  (0.018)  (0.049)  (0.041)  (0.063)  (0.035)  (0.037)  (0.030) 
Dummy for college degree   0.054***  0.061  0.084**  0.061  0.047  0.058  -0.014 
  (0.018)  (0.049)  (0.041)  (0.061)  (0.035)  (0.038)  (0.030) 
Dummy for advanced degree   0.052***  0.109**  0.069  0.056  0.001  0.048  -0.010 
  (0.019)  (0.052)  (0.043)  (0.064)  (0.037)  (0.039)  (0.032) 
Constant  0.436***  0.365*  0.256  0.321  0.778***  0.210  0.640*** 
  (0.095)  (0.218)  (0.192)  (0.296)  (0.143)  (0.188)  (0.183) 
               
Observations  640  653  490  332  653  653  640 
R-squared  0.040  0.041  0.013  0.035  0.031  0.020  0.008 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   38
Table 16 OLS Regressions Predicting Who Relies on Experts in the Financial Domain: The 
Effect of Health Domains 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model5 
           
Rely on expert in long-term care domain  0.353***         
  (0.062)         
Rely on expert in health insurance domain    0.005       
    (0.068)       
Rely on expert in health research domain      -0.019     
      (0.060)     
Rely on expert in diet domain        -0.032   
        (0.048)   
Rely on expert in health care visits domain          0.144** 
          (0.057) 
Age  -0.011  -0.019  -0.013  -0.013  -0.014 
  (0.011)  (0.016)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Age squared  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Home owner  0.128***  0.125**  0.138***  0.136***  0.135*** 
  (0.042)  (0.054)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035) 
Married  0.032  0.048  0.037  0.037  0.039 
  (0.037)  (0.045)  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
Male  -0.013  0.018  -0.000  -0.003  0.001 
  (0.034)  (0.043)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030) 
Dummy for some college   0.025  -0.003  0.016  0.017  0.023 
  (0.058)  (0.080)  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.049) 
Dummy for college degree   0.052  0.042  0.062  0.063  0.074 
  (0.059)  (0.078)  (0.049)  (0.050)  (0.050) 
Dummy for advanced degree   0.102*  0.087  0.109**  0.111**  0.119** 
  (0.061)  (0.081)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052) 
Constant  0.271  0.525  0.380*  0.372*  0.279 
  (0.244)  (0.353)  (0.221)  (0.219)  (0.218) 
           
Observations  490  332  653  653  640 
R-squared  0.107  0.039  0.041  0.041  0.051 
Note: Dependent variable in all models is reliance on expert in retirement planning. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   39
Table 17 OLS Regressions Predicting Self-Reported Health: The Effect of Relying on Experts 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
               
Average of expert questions  0.167             
  (0.224)             
Rely on expert in retirement planning    0.111           
    (0.080)           
Rely on expert in long-term care domain      0.037         
      (0.122)         
Rely on expert in health insurance domain        0.074       
        (0.130)       
Rely on expert in health research domain          -0.084     
          (0.132)     
Rely on expert in diet domain            -0.131   
            (0.108)   
Rely on expert in health care visits domain              0.258* 
              (0.146) 
Age  -0.002  -0.010  -0.007  -0.014  -0.012  -0.012  -0.004 
  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.029)  (0.035)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Age squared  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Home owner  0.243***  0.235***  0.261**  0.180  0.253***  0.248***  0.246*** 
  (0.088)  (0.088)  (0.111)  (0.124)  (0.087)  (0.088)  (0.087) 
Married  0.087  0.077  0.110  0.096  0.081  0.085  0.084 
  (0.075)  (0.074)  (0.087)  (0.101)  (0.074)  (0.074)  (0.074) 
Male  -0.073  -0.080  -0.109  -0.053  -0.076  -0.089  -0.075 
  (0.061)  (0.061)  (0.071)  (0.088)  (0.061)  (0.061)  (0.061) 
Dummy for some college   -0.190*  -0.190*  -0.183  -0.290*  -0.186*  -0.183*  -0.181* 
  (0.105)  (0.102)  (0.130)  (0.162)  (0.102)  (0.103)  (0.104) 
Dummy for college degree   0.066  0.045  0.054  -0.109  0.056  0.059  0.078 
  (0.105)  (0.102)  (0.128)  (0.157)  (0.101)  (0.102)  (0.103) 
Dummy for advanced degree   -0.004  -0.012  -0.013  -0.135  0.000  0.006  0.007 
  (0.106)  (0.105)  (0.129)  (0.160)  (0.103)  (0.104)  (0.105) 
Constant  3.750***  4.018***  3.923***  4.100***  4.124***  4.086***  3.658*** 
  (0.537)  (0.521)  (0.626)  (0.797)  (0.521)  (0.530)  (0.537) 
               
Observations  640  653  490  332  653  653  640 
R-squared  0.043  0.042  0.040  0.033  0.040  0.041  0.048 
Note: Dependent variable in all models is Self-reported health. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   40
Table 18 OLS Regressions Predicting log of Wealth: The Effect of Relying on Experts 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
               
Average of expert questions  4.531***             
  (0.855)             
Rely on expert in retirement planning    2.060***           
    (0.285)           
Rely on expert in long-term care domain      1.140***         
      (0.434)         
Rely on expert in health insurance domain        0.309       
        (0.448)       
Rely on expert in health research domain          -0.313     
          (0.528)     
Rely on expert in diet domain            0.733*   
            (0.404)   
Rely on expert in health care visits domain              0.225 
              (0.577) 
Age  0.110  0.127  0.033  0.150  0.098  0.104  0.095 
  (0.095)  (0.095)  (0.109)  (0.148)  (0.097)  (0.096)  (0.099) 
Age squared  -0.001  -0.001  -0.000  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Home owner  2.437***  2.363***  1.921***  1.955***  2.657***  2.653***  2.634*** 
  (0.420)  (0.419)  (0.480)  (0.561)  (0.430)  (0.428)  (0.432) 
Married  0.647**  0.650**  0.788**  0.448  0.726**  0.703**  0.734** 
  (0.309)  (0.307)  (0.330)  (0.353)  (0.310)  (0.312)  (0.311) 
Male  0.563**  0.525**  0.420  1.155***  0.539**  0.571**  0.558** 
  (0.248)  (0.248)  (0.269)  (0.311)  (0.257)  (0.259)  (0.254) 
Dummy for some college   0.238  0.552  0.523  1.677**  0.595  0.552  0.356 
  (0.499)  (0.495)  (0.638)  (0.762)  (0.513)  (0.514)  (0.509) 
Dummy for college degree   1.049**  1.374***  1.881***  1.848**  1.515***  1.458***  1.295*** 
  (0.489)  (0.485)  (0.601)  (0.744)  (0.507)  (0.507)  (0.498) 
Dummy for advanced degree   2.050***  2.317***  2.577***  2.884***  2.543***  2.507***  2.288*** 
  (0.478)  (0.469)  (0.605)  (0.731)  (0.490)  (0.491)  (0.485) 
Constant  1.497  2.288  5.208**  1.728  3.285  2.887  3.330 
  (2.093)  (2.078)  (2.281)  (3.394)  (2.135)  (2.077)  (2.212) 
               
Observations  640  653  490  332  653  653  640 
R-squared  0.244  0.260  0.201  0.247  0.216  0.219  0.212 
Note: Dependent variable in all models is log of wealth accumulated for retirement. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   41
Table 19 OLS Regressions Predicting log of Wealth: The Effect of Health and Relying on Experts 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
Self-reported health  0.384**  0.323*  0.332*  0.517***  0.003  0.382**  0.399**  0.345* 
  (0.178)  (0.173)  (0.170)  (0.186)  (0.168)  (0.179)  (0.178)  (0.177) 
Average of expert questions    4.477***             
    (0.849)             
Rely on expert in retirement planning      2.024***           
      (0.282)           
Rely on expert in long-term care domain        1.121***         
        (0.428)         
Rely on expert in health insurance domain          0.308       
          (0.448)       
Rely on expert in health research domain            -0.281     
            (0.524)     
Rely on expert in diet domain              0.785**   
              (0.397)   
Rely on expert in health care visits domain                0.136 
                (0.574) 
Age  0.105  0.111  0.130  0.036  0.150  0.103  0.109  0.097 
  (0.097)  (0.095)  (0.095)  (0.107)  (0.149)  (0.097)  (0.096)  (0.099) 
Age squared  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.000  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Home owner  2.548***  2.358***  2.285***  1.786***  1.954***  2.561***  2.554***  2.549*** 
  (0.436)  (0.427)  (0.425)  (0.480)  (0.565)  (0.437)  (0.434)  (0.438) 
Married  0.694**  0.619**  0.625**  0.731**  0.448  0.695**  0.669**  0.705** 
  (0.309)  (0.309)  (0.306)  (0.325)  (0.358)  (0.309)  (0.311)  (0.311) 
Male  0.553**  0.586**  0.551**  0.477*  1.156***  0.568**  0.606**  0.584** 
  (0.256)  (0.248)  (0.249)  (0.270)  (0.311)  (0.257)  (0.259)  (0.254) 
Dummy for some college   0.656  0.300  0.615  0.618  1.678**  0.665  0.625  0.418 
  (0.515)  (0.501)  (0.497)  (0.636)  (0.767)  (0.515)  (0.516)  (0.510) 
Dummy for college degree   1.481***  1.028**  1.359***  1.853***  1.848**  1.494***  1.435***  1.268** 
  (0.507)  (0.491)  (0.487)  (0.600)  (0.743)  (0.508)  (0.508)  (0.500) 
Dummy for advanced degree   2.542***  2.051***  2.321***  2.584***  2.884***  2.543***  2.504***  2.285*** 
  (0.492)  (0.480)  (0.470)  (0.605)  (0.732)  (0.492)  (0.493)  (0.487) 
Constant  1.482  0.288  0.955  3.179  1.717  1.710  1.255  2.068 
  (2.228)  (2.213)  (2.192)  (2.382)  (3.452)  (2.261)  (2.206)  (2.306) 
                 
Reduction in coef. on health from column 1    16%  14%  -35%  99%  1%  -4%  10% 
Observations  653  640  653  490  332  653  653  640 
R-squared  0.222  0.249  0.265  0.216  0.247  0.223  0.227  0.217 
Note: Dependent variable in all models is log of wealth accumulated for retirement. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   42
 
Table 20 Blinder-Oaxaca Decompositions Comparing Healthy and Less Healthy 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Wealth if health is poor  9.113***  9.113***  9.204*** 
  (0.308)  (0.308)  (0.305) 
Wealth if health is excellent or very good  10.301***  10.301***  10.350*** 
  (0.156)  (0.156)  (0.155) 
Difference  -1.188***  -1.188***  -1.146*** 
  (0.345)  (0.345)  (0.342) 
       
Amount explained  -0.571***  -0.589***  -0.607*** 
  (0.165)  (0.166)  (0.179) 
Percent explained  48%  50%  53% 
       
Amount unexplained  -0.617*  -0.598*  -0.539* 
  (0.328)  (0.327)  (0.314) 
Percent unexplained  52%  50%  47% 
       
Amount explained by decision making     -0.016  -0.049 
    (0.028)  (0.062) 
Percent explained by decision making    1%  4% 
       








       
Sample size  653  653  640 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   43
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Appendix Table A1 Description of Questions about Relying on Friends and Family  
Name  Question  Mean  Std. Dev.  Median 
Relying on Friends, Family and Colleagues 
friend_fin  Talking to my friends helped me to come up with a plan to prepare for retirement.    0.312  0.285  0.25 
friend_hi  I talked to my friends or colleagues to figure out which health insurance plan was best.    0.389  0.326  0.375 
friend_hc  When I have to make a decision about health care, I talk to friends, family and/or colleagues to figure out what is best.  0.639  0.252  0.75 
         
friends  Average friend score: (friend_fin+friend_hi+friend_hc)/3  0.463  0.208  0.5   45
Appendix Table A2 Description of Questions about Relying on Experts  
Name  Question  Mean  Std. Dev.  Median 
Retirement Planning Domain 
exp_fin  How closely do you follow the suggestions of the financial advisor, software or calculator? You may check more than 
one answer.   
     
  I closely follow the suggestions.   
I loosely follow the suggestions.   
I rarely follow the suggestions.   
I generally save less than is suggested.   
I generally save more than is suggested.   
There are some needs that are neglected.   
     
  exp_fin3=1 if following closely 
exp_fin3=5/6 if follow closely and loosely 
exp_fin3=4/6 if follow loosely or save less or save more  
exp_fin3=3/6 if follow rarely and loosely  
fin3=2/6 if follow rarely 
exp_fin3=0 if don’t use advisor, software, or calculator  0.166  0.321  0 
Other Domains 
exp_hf  I relied on advice from a financial advisor or insurance broker to decide if I should buy long-term care insurance.    0.243  0.291  0 
exp_hi  I chose a [health insurance] plan based on the hospitals and doctors that participated in the network.    0.620  0.315  0.75 
exp_hr  When I have to make a decision about health care, I rely on whatever my doctor tells me to do.    0.647  0.248  0.75 
Exp_food I follow a diet such as the Atkins diet, the Best Life Diet, Weight Watchers or some other diet plan.    0.186  0.291  0 
exp_doc  How closely do you follow the suggestions of your doctor? Please indicate which of the below statements fits best your 
situation.  You may check several answers.   
I closely follow the suggestions of my doctor.   
I loosely follow his/her suggestions.   
I rarely follow his/her suggestions.   
I would like to follow the suggestions, but I don' t manage to do so.   
exp_doc=1 if follow closely 
exp_doc=5/6 if follow closely and loosely 
exp_doc=4/6 if follow loosely 
exp_doc=3/6 if follow rarely and loosely 
exp_doc=2/6 if follow rarely 
exp_doc=0 if don’t follow  0.831  0.238  1 
Average Expert Reliance 
expert  Average Expert Score: Average of exp_fin, exp,_hf, exp_hi, exp_hr,exp_food, exp_doc  0.456  0.147  0.45 
Note: Sample sizes vary across measures.  Individuals who had never heard of long-term care insurance were not asked about reliance on experts.  Similarly 
those who had not seen a doctor in 5 years were excluded from questions about how closely they followed their doctor’s advice.  Again, those who reported no 
choices for health insurance were excluded from those questions. 